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ABSTRACT
A fundamentally important role of the Web economy is Online
Resource Allocation (ORA) from producers to consumers, such as
product allocation in E-commerce, job allocation in freelancing
platforms, and driver resource allocation in P2P riding services.
Since users have the freedom to choose, such allocations are not
provided in a forced manner, but usually in forms of personalized
recommendation, where users have the right to refuse.
Current recommendation approaches mostly provide allocations
to match the preference of each individual user, instead of treat-
ing the Web application as a whole economic system where users
therein are mutually correlated on the allocations. is lack of
global view leads to Pareto ineciency, i.e., we can actually improve
the recommendations by beering some users while not hurting
the others, and it means that the system did not achieve its best
possible allocation. is problem is especially severe when the total
amount of each resource is limited, so that its allocation to one (set
of) user means that other users are le out.
In this paper, we propose Pareto Ecient Economic Recommen-
dation (PEER) – that the system provides the best possible (i.e.,
Pareto optimal) recommendations, where no user can gain further
benets without hurting the others. To this end, we propose a Multi-
Objective Optimization (MOO) framework to maximize the surplus
of each user simultaneously, and provide recommendations based
on the resulting Pareto optima. To benet the many existing recom-
mendation algorithms, we further propose a Pareto Improvement
Process (PIP) to turn their recommendations into Pareto ecient
ones. Experiments on real-world datasets verify that PIP improves
existing algorithms on recommendation performance and consumer
surplus, while the direct PEER approach gains the best performance
on both aspects.
KEYWORDS
Pareto Eciency; Online Resource Allocation; Multi-Objective Op-
timization; Economic Recommendation; Computational Economics
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the trending of human activities shiing from oine to online,
the Web has turned into a whole unied economic system just like
our physical world, where users can accomplish various types of
daily tasks conveniently.
Same as our real-world economic system that has been drawing
the aention of economists for centuries, an important functionality
of the Web is Online Resource Allocation (ORA), which distributes
online products or services from producers to consumers at the
speed of internet. For example, E-commerce systems like Amazon
distribute normal goods from retailers to users, while house sharing
applications like Airbnb distribute housing facilities from hosts to
guests.
Because users are granted by law the freedom to choose, en-
forced online resource allocation is not favorable. As a result, such
allocation processes are usually conducted implicitly by personal-
ized recommendation [37], which “suggests” the users to choose
particular services.
Since the beginning of modern economics, economists have been
taking care of the eciency of economic systems [14]. e key
insight is Pareto eciency, named aer economist Vilfredo Pareto
(1906) [32] – one of the pioneers of microeconomics, who is also
famous for his “80/20 rule” derived from this concept. Pareto ef-
ciency claims that an ecient system should be one in such an
optimal status – that no one can gain further benets without hurt-
ing the others. If a system is not Pareto ecient, we can promote
it by Pareto improvements – to increase the benets of some users
while not decreasing the others’ – until the system is ecient.
Pareto eciency is widely considered not only in economic anal-
ysis [12], but in various engineering tasks, e.g., electric power distri-
bution [47], network bandwidth allocation [50], and task scheduling
in cloud computing systems [45], etc.
However, though as a major form of service allocation on the
Web, current recommender systems seldom consider whether the al-
locations are Pareto ecient or not in an economic sense. Basically,
both the content-based [33] and Collaborative Filtering (CF)-based
[11, 19] approaches aempt to maximize the degree that user pref-
erences are matched by the recommended items [37], rather than
viewing the Web economy as a whole, where the benets of dif-
ferent users can be mutually correlated. is results in the Pareto
ineciency of the recommendations – that the system is not su-
ciently optimized to reach the best status, so that it is still possible
to benet the experience of some users without hurting the others.
In this work, we propose Pareto Ecient Economic Recommen-
dation (PEER) for optimal online resource allocation. With solid
economic theories and real-world user behavior records, we esti-
mate the per-user utility and surplus on each item to measure the
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user benets. Based on this, we propose a Multi-Objective Opti-
mization (MOO) framework to maximize the user benets jointly,
so as to nd the Pareto optimal solution for ecient service alloca-
tion among users. is allocation can thus be adopted to provide
personalized recommendations in recommender systems.
Over the years, many eective recommendation algorithms have
been developed and they are widely applied to practical systems.
Although their provided recommendation results may not be Pareto
ecient, taking advantage of the many existing algorithms can help
to reduce the complexity in practical applications. erefore, we
further propose a Pareto Improvement Process (PIP) on top of any
given recommendation algorithm, which promotes the recommen-
dation results to Pareto ecient ones by Pareto improvements.
Results on real-world E-commerce datasets show that, PIP in-
creases both the recommendation performance and allocation ef-
ciency of traditional recommendation algorithms, while a direct
PEER approach gains the best performance on both aspects.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 introduces some basic concepts
for the work. In Section 3 we propose our Pareto ecient economic
recommendation framework based on MOO, and in Section 4, we
further provide the Pareto improvement process to boost the e-
ciency of existing recommendation algorithms. Some discussions
are made in Section 5, with experimental results provided in Sec-
tion 6. We present the related work in Section 7 and conclusions in
Section 8.
2 BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we formally introduce the key concepts of utility,
surplus, and Pareto eciency from economics, which will serve as
the theoretical basis of our framework.
2.1 Utility and Surplus
In economics, utility measures one’s satisfaction over one or a
portfolio of goods or services. Utility can be measured in terms of
money, and it is the basic concept that serves as the underpinning
of the rational choice theory [10].
Utility U (q) is usually a function of the consumption quantity
q, and is inherently governed by the Law Of Diminishing Marginal
Utility [38], which states that as a person increases the consumption
of a product, there is a decline in the marginal utility that he derives
from consuming each additional unit of the product, e.g., when
forcing a person who is full to consume an additional bread. is
gives U ′′(q) < 0, while the marginal utility U ′(q) > 0.
Economists have introduced various forms for utility, for exam-
ple, the most representative King-Plosser-Rebelo (KPR) utility:
U (q) = a ln(1 + q) (1)
where the parameter a measures the risk aversion as well as the
overall li of the curve.
Based on the theories of rational choice, a consumer would
purchase a product/service only if she thinks that the utility she
gains from the product is higher than the price that she has to pay,
and surplus measures the extra amount of satisfaction she gains
beyond the paid price in the transaction. Let P be the per-product
price, thus the surplus S(q) is:
S(q) = U (q) − P · q (2)
In modern economics, the concept of surplus has solid theoretical
origins from the supply-demand economic analysis framework
[5, 6], and it is adopted to quantify the benets of consumers in
economic systems.
2.2 Multi-Objective Optimization
Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) originally grew out of three
areas [28]: economic equilibrium and welfare theories, game theory,
and pure mathematics. e mathematical and economic approaches
to MOO were united with the inception of game theory by Borel in
1921 [44]. e general MOO problem is posed as follows:
maximize
x
F(x) = [F1(x), F2(x), · · · , Fk (x)]ᵀ
s .t . дr (x) ≤ 0, r = 1, 2, · · · , s
hl (x) = 0, l = 1, 2, · · · , e
(3)
where k is the number of objective functions, s is the number of
inequality constraints, and e is the number of equality constraints.
x ∈ Rn is a vector of decision variables, and F(x) ∈ Rk is a vector of
objective functions Fi (x): Rn → R. All vectors are column vectors,
and any comparison (≤, ≥, etc.) of vectors applies to each element.
e objective functions Fi (x) in multi-objective optimization
problems are usually mutually correlated, so that the increase on
one objective may lead to the decease of another. As a result, given
an MOO problem, we are usually interested in its Pareto ecient
solutions, which are introduced in the following subsection.
2.3 Pareto Eciency and Improvement
Dierent from single-objective optimization, there is typically no
single global solution to an MOO problem. Usually there exist a
set of points that all t a predetermined denition for an optimum.
e predominant concept in dening an optimal point is Pareto
eciency (or Pareto optimal) (Pareto 1906) [32], which is,
Denition 2.1. A point x∗ is Pareto ecient i there does not
exist another point x, such that F(x) ≥ F(x∗) with at least one
Fi (x) > Fi (x∗). Otherwise, x∗ is Pareto inecient.
Denition 2.2. Pareto Frontier: e set of all Pareto ecient
points is called the Pareto (ecient) frontier.
It would be important to note that Pareto eciency itself does not
imply equality or fairness in an economic system. In fact, a Pareto
ecient status can be extremely unbalanced – that a few individuals
may take a great share of the benets, while the remaining ones
possess only a small portion. As a result, we may need to take
special consideration to nd the economically favorable Pareto
ecient solution to a system.
Denition 2.3. Pareto Improvement: A status from point x1 to
x2 is called a Pareto improvement i F(x1) ≤ F(x2) with at least
one Fi (x1) < Fi (x2).
Denition 2.4. Utopia Point: A point F◦ ∈ Rk is a utopia point
i for each i = 1, 2, · · · ,k , F◦i = maximizex Fi (x). e corresponding
variable x◦i is the utopia decision variable.
Intuitively, a Pareto improvement is an action conducted in a
system that harms no one and helps at least one person. Pareto
improvements will keep adding to the economy until it achieves
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a Pareto optimum (convergence), where no more Pareto improve-
ments can be made [28].
Utopia point (or ideal point) is the most ideal solution to an MOO
problem, but in general it is unaainable. However, it can help to
nd the Pareto optimal solution to MOO.
3 PARETO EFFICIENT ECONOMIC
RECOMMENDATION
We propose our Pareto Ecient Economic Recommendation (PEER)
framework in this section. We rst formalize the problem into an
Online Resource Allocation (ORA) framework with multi-objective
surplus maximization, and further propose methods to estimate the
personalized utility and surplus with economic theories.
3.1 Problem Formalization
Suppose there existm users {u1,u2, · · · ,um } in an online economic
system, and there aren items {v1,v2, · · · ,vn } to be allocated among
the users, where the maximum quantity of each item consists the
quantity vector q = [q1,q2, · · · ,qn ]ᵀ . In the following, we use
1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n to index the users and items, respectively.
e Online Resource Allocation (ORA) [52] problem aims to nd
an allocation matrix Q = [Qi j ]m×n , where Qi j ≥ 0 is the quantity
that user ui is provided with item vj , under the maximum quantity
constraint of
∑m
i=1 Qi j ≤ qj , ∀j.
Pareto ecient recommendation thus aempts to provide rec-
ommendations according to the Pareto ecient allocation of the
online services in terms of per-user benets (i.e., surplus). Let Qi
be the allocation vector for user ui so that Q = [Q1Q2 · · ·Qm ]ᵀ ,
and let Si (Qi ) be the surplus that user ui achieves from his/her
allocated items. We aim to solve the following MOO problem,
maximize
Q=[Qi j ]m×n
S(Q) = [S1(Q1), S2(Q2), · · · , Sm (Qm )]ᵀ
s .t . Qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
m∑
i=1
Qi j ≤ qj , j = 1, 2, · · · ,n
(4)
which maximizes the surpluses of dierent users jointly. e model
produces Pareto ecient allocations on user benets, which are
taken to make system decisions.
3.2 Model Specication
e key to specifying the mathematical form of Eq.(4) is to calculate
the per-user surplus Si (Qi ) given an arbitrary allocation matrix Qi .
Let Pj be the price of item vj , which is pre-known, we have,
Si (Qi ) =
n∑
j=1
Si (Qi j ) =
n∑
j=1
(
Ui j (Qi j ) − Pj ·Qi j
)
(5)
where Ui j (·) is the utility of user ui on item vj . It is important to
notice that the utility functionUi j (·) is personalized – that dierent
users may gain dierent utilities even on the same quantity of the
same item. is is because of the dierent preferences of users,
namely, a product favored by this user may not be quite favored by
another one, and this nature serves as the inherent driving power
for personalized recommendation.
In this work, we estimate the personalized utilityUi j (q) per user-
item level to represent the personalized user preference on each
item. Specically, the utility for dierent user-item pairs share the
same form but are parameterized by dierent parameters:
Ui j (q) = ai j ln(1 + q) , (α + βi + γj + uᵀi vj ) ln(1 + q) (6)
where the risk aversion parameter ai j is re-parameterized in the
spirit of collaborative ltering: α , βi ,γj are the global, user, and
item osets; and ui , vj ∈ Rk+ are the user and item representation
vectors, respectively.
As a result, the calculation of per-user surplus boils down to the
estimation of per user-item utility function Ui j (q).
3.3 Personalized Utility Estimation
Similar to [52], we conduct personalized utility estimation based
on the observed user purchasing records. Let qi j be the quantity
that user ui purchased item vj , and Si j (qi j ) = Ui j (qi j ) − Pjqi j be
the surplus that user ui gains from this purchase. en the Law of
Zero Surplus for the Last Unit [13] in economics states that,
∆Si j (qi j ) = Si j (qi j ) − Si j (qi j − 1) ≥ 0
∆Si j (qi j + 1) = Si j (qi j + 1) − Si j (qi j ) < 0 (7)
Intuitively, it means that the reason a user purchases a quantity of
qi j on an item, is that he/she can still obtain increased surplus with
the last unit, but even a single more unit of purchase will decease
the surplus. With this, we maximize the following log-likelihood
of observing the whole purchasing records dataset D,
maximize
Θ
logp(D)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ii j
(
Pr
(
∆Si j (qi j ) ≥ 0
)
Pr
(
∆Si j (qi j + 1) < 0
) ) − λ‖Ω‖2F (8)
where Ω = {α , βi ,γj , ui , vj }m ni=1j=1 is the parameter set, Ii j is an
indicator whose value is 1 when user ui purchased item vj in the
dataset and 0 otherwise, λ > 0 is the regularization coecient,
and ui , vj ∈ Rk+ are non-negative. We adopt the commonly used
sigmoid function to model the probabilities:
Pr
(
∆Si j (qi j ) ≥ 0
)
=
1
1 + exp(−∆Si j (qi j ))
Pr
(
∆Si j (qi j + 1) < 0
)
= 1 − Pr (∆Si j (qi j + 1) ≥ 0) (9)
We optimize Eq.(8) by Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to get
the optimal parameter set Θ, thus obtain the per user-item utility
functions Ui j (q) = (α + βi + γj + uᵀi vj ) ln(1 + q).
3.4 MOO Scalarization
Given utility functionsUi j (q), prices Pj , and quantity constraints
q = [q1,q2, · · · ,qn ]ᵀ , the MOO function in Eq.(4) is determined
only on the allocation matrix Q = [Qi j ]m×n .
Since its existence, researchers have proposed various approaches
to multi-objective optimization, and they can be generally classied
into a priori, a posteriori and interactive methods, which involve the
preference information from the decision maker priorly, posteriorly,
or interactively during the model learning process [28].
In this work, we adopt the a priori approach because we aim
at an oine learning algorithm for Pareto ecient allocation. To
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do so, we adopt the scalarization method to transform the multi-
objective problem into a single-objective one. When scalarization
is done neatly, Pareto optimality of the solutions obtained can be
guaranteed [29]. It is proven that minimizing the following function
is necessary and sucient for Pareto optimality of Eq.(4) [28, 49]:
minimize
Q=[Qi j ]m×n
S(Q) =
m∑
i=1
wi
(
Si (Qi ) − S◦i
)2
s .t . Qi ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
Qi j ≤ qj , ∀i, j
(10)
where w1,w2, · · · ,wm ≥ 0 are the weights set by the decision
maker, whose relative values reect the decision maker’s preference
on the importance of each user. Mathematically, dierent choices
of weights will result in dierent Pareto ecient optima, although
many of them can be extremely unbalanced. Because we treat the
benets of each user equally and do not pose any special preference
on specic users, we adopt identical weights wi = 1 in this work.
S◦i is the Utopia point for user ui , which is determined by the
maximum possible surplus of the user. We already have:
Si (Qi j ) = Ui j (Qi j ) − PjQi j = ai j ln(1 +Qi j ) − PjQi j (11)
Let derivative be zero with respect to global quantity limits:
S ′(Qi j ) =
ai j
1 +Qi j
− Pj = 0, w .r .t . Qi j ≤ qj (12)
We thus have the utopia decision variable Q◦i j and utopia point S
◦
i :
Q◦i j = min
(
ai j
Pj
− 1, qj
)
,∀j = 1, 2, · · · ,n
S◦i =
n∑
j=1
(
Ui j (Q◦i j ) − PjQ◦i j
)
,∀i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(13)
With these components, we plug Eq.(5)(6)(13) and wi = 1 into
Eq.(10) for model specication.
3.5 Model Learning
We transform Eq.(10) into a non-constrained problem with penalties,
so that it can be conveniently solved with gradient optimization.
More concretely, we transform the two constraints into penalty
terms added to the objective to penalize infeasible solutions:
minimize
Q=[Qi j ]m×n
L(Q) =
∑
i
(∑
j
(
ai j ln(1 +Qi j ) − PjQi j
) − S◦i )2
−λ1
∑
i, j
log(Qi j ) − λ2
∑
j
min
{
0,qj −
∑
i
Qi j
} (14)
where the second term is the log-barrier function that prevents
the elements in Q from approaching the nonnegative cone, and
the last term is a hinge-loss that penalizes an allocation that vi-
olates the quantity constraint. One may also use the hinge-loss
−λ1 ∑i, j min{0,Qi j } for Q ≥ 0, but this would give sparse optima,
which are not favored in this work because we rely on the result
allocation matrix Q to rank all the items for each user.
In Eq.(14), λ1, λ2 ∈ R+ determine the tradeo between the ac-
curacy of the approximation procedure and the feasibility of the
solution. With λ1 and λ2 → ∞, any violation of the constraints
will be greatly penalized and the solution is guaranteed to be in the
Algorithm 1: Pareto Efficient Allocation
Input: Initial penalty parameters λ(0)1 , λ
(0)
2 > 0, step factor
µ > 1, initial learning rate γ (0) < 1, threshold
0 < ϵ1, ϵ2  1, dimension k for latent factors u′i , v′j
Output: Pareto ecient allocation matrix Q∗
1 Initialize Θ(0)∗ = {α ′, β ′i ,γ ′j , u′i , v′j }m ni=1j=1 randomly;
2 repeat
3 Θ
(t )
0 ← Θ
(t−1)
∗ ;
4 repeat
5 Compute the gradient ∇ΘL(Θ(t )l ) by Eq.(18);
6 Θ
(t )
l+1 ← Θ
(t )
l − γ (t )∇ΘL(Θ
(t )
l );
7 until ‖Θ(t )l+1 − Θ
(t )
l ‖ < ϵ1;
8 Θ
(t )
∗ ← Θ(t )L ;
9 λ
(t+1)
1 ← µλ
(t )
1 , λ
(t+1)
2 ← µλ
(t )
2 ,γ
(t+1) ← γ (t )/µ;
10 until λ(t )1 > 1/ϵ2 and λ
(t )
2 > 1/ϵ2;
11 return Q∗ ← Q(Θ(t )∗ );
feasible region. However, the objective term maybe dominated by
these two penalty terms, causing the solution to be inaccurate.
To combine the best of two worlds, we propose a sequential
minimization framework: for each xed pair (λ1, λ2), we optimize
Eq.(14) to nd a local minimum solution Q(λ1, λ2) which depends
on the current (λ1, λ2), then we increase the parameters (λ1, λ2)
by a factor µ > 1 and restart the optimization with Q(λ1, λ2) as
the initial point. To increase the approximation accuracy when λ1
and λ2 get larger, we increase the number of steps per iteration,
ensuring that the penalty terms will vanish as the solution becomes
feasible, and the objective term will get fully optimized. e process
is repeated until the current solution is a stationary point.
To apply the sequential minimization framework, we derive the
gradient for Eq.(14), where ∇1Q ,∇2Q ,∇3Q denote the gradient for
each of the three additive components:
∇1Q =
2
(∑
j
Si (Qi j ) − S◦i
) ( ai j
1 +Qi j
− Pj
)m×n
∇2Q = −λ1
[
1
Qi j
]
m×n
, ∇3Q = −λ2
(
1m · Iqᵀ−1ᵀmQ<0
) (15)
where 1m is a column vector of 1’s, and Iqᵀ−1ᵀmQ<0 is the indicator
function Ix<0 applied to every element of the vector qᵀ − 1ᵀmQ . As
a result, the gradient of Eq.(14) will be:
∇QL(Q) = ∇1Q + ∇2Q + ∇3Q (16)
However, the huge number of users and items in practice makes
it computationally infeasible to directly gradient on the allocation
matrix Q . As a result, we still re-parameterize the allocation matrix
according to the spirit of collaborative ltering, i.e., let
Qi j = α
′ + β ′i + γ
′
j + u
′ᵀ
i v
′
j (17)
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whereΘ = {α ′, β ′i ,γ ′j , u′i , v′j }m ni=1j=1 is the parameter set, and u′i , v′j ∈
Rk+ are latent vectors. As a result, Q becomes an intermediate pa-
rameter and the gradient on low-dimensional parameters Θ is:
∇ΘL(Θ) = ∇QL(Q) · ∇ΘQ = (∇1Q + ∇2Q + ∇3Q ) · ∇ΘQ (18)
Once we obtain a closed form solution to compute the gradients,
we can apply various kinds of unconstrained minimization algo-
rithms, e.g., gradient descent, conjugate gradient or L-BFGS [3].
For illustrative purposes, we provide an algorithm using gradient
descent in Algorithms 1. Assuming the algorithm will perform τ
iterations in each inner loop, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(τmn logµ ( 1λϵ )).
With the Pareto ecient allocation matrix Q∗ produced by the
algorithm, we can thus provide the personalized recommendation
list for each user ui by ranking the items vj in descending order of
the quantity Q∗i j allocated to him/her.
4 PARETO IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
Researchers have developed many successful personalized recom-
mendation algorithms, which are widely applied to various practi-
cal systems. Taking advantages of their insightful designs can be
benecial to both the practitioners and recommendation results.
Although they do not primarily consider Pareto eciency of
the recommendations, their results can be promoted into Pareto
ecient ones, which improves the user benets, and meanwhile
keeps a satisfactory recommendation performance. To this end, we
propose a Pareto Improvement Process (PIP) in this section.
We rst construct the replication allocation matrix Qˆ from the
recommendation results of a given recommendation algorithm. Let
the top-K recommendation list for user ui given by the algorithm
be Ri = {vi1 ,vi2 , · · · ,viK }, we construct the corresponding recom-
mendation vector ri = [Ivj ∈Ri ]n×1, where the j-th element is 1 if
the j-th item is in the recommendation list, and 0 otherwise. With
the vectors for all users, we have Qˆ = [r1r2 · · · rm ]ᵀ .
Note that Qˆ may not satisfy the quantity constraint q = [q1,q2 · · ·qn ]ᵀ .
To make it feasible, we examine each column of Qˆ , and if
∑m
i=1 Qˆi j >
qj , we only retain a total number qj of 1’s in that column. ese
1’s correspond to the users whose recommendation list Ri ranks
item vj in higher position, i.e., we allocate the limited number of
item vj to those users who beer prefer the item. To help with a
clearer understanding, we present the procedure in Algorithm 2.
Based on the replication allocation matrix Qˆ , we calculate the
current benet Sˆi = Si (Qˆi ) for each user ui , and further solve the
following Pareto improvement problem:
maximize
Q=[Qi j ]m×n
S(Q) = [S1(Q1), S2(Q2), · · · , Sm (Qm )]ᵀ
s .t . Qi ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
Qi j ≤ qj , Si (Qi ) ≥ Sˆi , ∀i, j
(19)
where the third constraint is incorporated to guarantee Pareto
improvements.
Algorithm 2: Replication Matrix Construction
Input: Top-K recommendation list
Ri = {vi1 ,vi2 , · · · ,viK } for each user ui , quantity
constraint q = [q1,q2, · · · ,qn ]ᵀ
Output: Replicate allocation matrix Qˆ
1 for each user ui (i ← 1 tom) do
2 ri ← [Ivj ∈Ri ]n×1; //identication vector
3 pi ← [∞]n×1; //ranking position vector
4 for each item vj (j ← 1 to n) do
5 if vj ∈ Ri and vj ≡ vik then
6 pi j ← k ; //record the ranking position
7 Qˆ ← [r1, r2, · · · , rm ]ᵀ ;
8 for each item vj (j ← 1 to n) do
9 if
∑m
i=1 Qˆi j > qj then
10 Rank users (ui ’s) in ascending order of pi j ;
11 Keep Qˆi j = 1 for top-qj users and change the
remaining to 0;
12 return Qˆ ;
Similarly, Eq.(19) can be scalarized and further converted into
the following non-constrained optimization problem:
minimize
Q=[Qi j ]m×n
Lˆ(Q) =
∑
i
(
Si (Qi ) − S◦i
)2 − λ1 ∑
i, j
log(Qi j )
− λ2
∑
j
min
{
0,qj −
∑
i
Qi j
}
− λ3
∑
j
min
{
0, Si (Qi ) − Sˆi
} (20)
where the gradient for the last term is:
∇4Q = −λ3
(
IS(Q )−Sˆ<0 · 1
ᵀ
n
)
(21)
With the gradients∇Q Lˆ(Q) = ∇1Q+∇2Q+∇3Q+∇4Q and∇ΘLˆ(Θ) =
∇Q Lˆ(Q) · ∇ΘQ , we can still adopt Algorithm 1 for model learning,
and take the output Pareto ecient allocation matrix for personal-
ized recommendation.
5 DISCUSSIONS
We further discuss some of the properties of the Pareto ecient
economic recommendation framework and Pareto improvement
process.
We can see that when qj = ∞ (∀j) in Eq.(4), the quantity con-
straint components in Eq.(10)(14) (19)(20) all vanish, and ∇3Q = 0
in Eq.(15). As a result, the model learning process automatically
turns into a non-constrained one. Besides, the surplus Si (Qi ) that
each user achieves from an allocation are no longer mutually corre-
lated in this case, thus the Pareto ecient model learning actually
maximizes the surplus of each user independently, and reaches the
utopia points. As a result, the quantity constraints (i.e., limited
resource allocation) serve as the critical component to bridge the
relationship of dierent users, because the allocation of an item to
one user may imply that other users are neglected, which is similar
to our physical economic world.
Except for the consumer surplus (i.e., utility beyond price: U (q)−
Pq) that we have considered in this work, economists have also
studied producer surplus, i.e., price beyond cost: Pq −cq, where c is
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the per-item cost. In this work, we do not incorporate producer sur-
plus into consideration for total surplus maximization (as [52]) for
two reasons, 1) the producer surplus will mathematically be a xed
value when all items are allocated out, and 2) the price component
(Pq) osets when adding the producer and consumer surplus for
total surplus maximization, as a result, some users may be sacriced
for the maximization of collective interest (total surplus), which is
philosophically not favored. In this work, however, we guarantee
that each user benets and no one has to sacrice for the whole
economic system.
As stated before, the weight parameters wi in Eq.(10) determine
the distribution of benets among users, and dierent choices ofwi
lead to dierent Pareto ecient allocations. Although we choose
to treat users equally by seing identical wi ’s in this work, we
can actually control the distribution of benets among dierent
users with dierent weights, so as to achieve targeted (but still
Pareto ecient) allocations for specic business intelligence goals
in real-world systems.
6 EXPERIMENTS
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of
both the Pareto Ecient Economic Recommendation (PEER) and
Pareto Improvement Process (PIP), in terms of recommendation
performance, economic eciency, and Pareto eciency.
6.1 Dataset Description
We take the user purchasing records dataset from Shop.com for ex-
periments, because two of the most important information sources
needed in our framework are the price of items and quantity of pur-
chasing, which are absent in many of the other datasets. To avoid
the problem of cold-start [23, 51] so as to focus on our key research
target of Pareto ecient recommendation, we select those users
and items of at least ve purchasing records, which is a frequently
adopted pre-processing method in previous work [22, 23, 46]. Some
statistics of our dataset are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Statistics of the Shop.com dataset
#Consumers #Products #Transactions Density Train/Test
34,099 42,691 400,215 0.03% 75%/25%
For experimental purpose, we randomly select 75% of the trans-
actions from each user to construct the training set, and adopt the
remaining transactions as testing set for evaluation. is amounts
to around 100k transactions from 34k users towards 30k items in
the testing set.
6.2 Experimental Setup
We set the initial penalty parameters λ(0)1 = λ
(0)
2 = 0.1, step factor
µ = 2, initial learning rate γ (0) = 0.1, threshold ϵ1 = ϵ2 = 0.1, and
dimension of latent factors k = 20 in Algorithm 1. In the experi-
ments, we aim to provide and evaluate top-N recommendation lists
for users, where N runs from 1 to 50. As a result, we set the length
of recommendation list K = 50 when constructing the replication
allocation matrix in Algorithm 2, so that the baselines get fair (or
even beer) treatment.
When estimating the personalized utility function in Eq.(8), we
set λ = 0.05 and the dimension of representation vectors ui , vj ∈
Rk+ as k = 20, because we nd that 20 factors are suciently enough
to stable the model performance.
We take the following representative and state-of-the-art recom-
mendation algorithms for performance comparison:
• NMF: Non-negative Matrix Factoration [21], which is a
representative and one of the most frequently used matrix
factorization approach for personalized recommendation.
To apply, we construct the user-item purchasing quantity
sparse matrix and predict the missing values, based on
which to provide personalized recommendation list for
each user in descending order of the predictions.
• BPRMF:BayesianPersonalizedRanking withMatrix Factori-
zation [34] that is one of the state-of-the-art approaches
for ranking-based recommendation. In implementation,
we conduct balanced negative sampling on un-purchased
items for model learning.
• TSM: Total Surplus Maximization [52] approach that max-
imizes the total (i.e., consumer plus producer) surplus of
an economic system for service allocation and recommen-
dation. It is a state-of-the-art economic surplus-based ap-
proach for recommendation.
For each approach we carefully tune the parameters to achieve
the best performance. In NMF and BPRMF, we select 20 factors with
regularization coecient λ = 0.1, and for TSM we also use 20 factors
and use λ = 0.05,η = 5 for regularization. In the following, we use
PEER to represent our Pareto Ecient Economic Recommendation
approach proposed in this work. Besides, we also apply our Pareto
Improvement Process (PIP) on three of the baselines for evaluation,
which are denoted as PIP-NMF, PIP-BPRMF, and PIP-TSM in the
following, respectively.
We adopt dierent evaluation metics for dierent experimental
tasks, which will be exposited in each of the following subsections.
6.3 Recommendation Performance
We rst evaluate the performance on personalized recommendation
for each approach. To do so, we construct top-N recommendation
list for each user in the testing set based on each algorithm, and
take the Conversion-Rate@N (CR@N) for evaluation.
For a set of testing users and the top-N recommendation list for
each of them, CR@N is the percentage of lists that ‘hit’ the purchase
records in the testing set of the target user. In our experiment, N
runs from 1 to 50 with a step of 5. For each user in the testing set,
there are as many as 30k candidate products for recommendation,
and all the candidate products are present in the training dataset.
For computational eciency, we randomly select 1000 users to
evaluate average CR at each time, and the CR performance of 30
testing rounds are averaged to provide the nal evaluation results.
Figure 1(a) shows the experimental results of each algorithm, and
more specic numbers on typical choices of N are shown in Table 2.
We see that our PEER approach generally gains beer performance
than traditional algorithms (NMF and BPRMF). On considering that
the key dierent of PEER from previous algorithms is to model user
preferences with economic basis (personalized utility and surplus
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Table 2: Evaluation on averaged Conversion Rate (CR@N), Consumer Surplus (CS@N), Percentage Utopia Surplus (PUS@N)
on Top-N recommendation lists, where N = 1, 5, 10, 20. In each column, the improvement from ai to b j is signicant at 0.05
level for i < j, but numbers from dierent columns are not comparable.
N 1 5 10 20 Q
Algorithm CR(%) CS($) PUS(%) CR(%) CS($) PUS(%) CR(%) CS($) PUS(%) CR(%) CS($) PUS(%) PUSQ (%)
NMF 0.061 4.651 0.0011 0.101 15.521 0.0031 0.101 27.861 0.0081 0.201 48.151 0.0111 /
BPRMF 0.101 8.841 0.0011 0.242 20.541 0.0061 0.282 36.621 0.0131 0.513 72.041 0.0141 /
TSM 0.201 62.252 0.0021 0.302 205.843 0.0121 0.302 398.253 0.0171 0.624 562.203 0.027/ 54.612
PIP-NMF 0.151 26.922 0.0011 0.201 73.062 0.0071 0.232 108.752 0.0131 0.342 228.352 0.018/ 32.251
PIP-BPRMF 0.151 41.602 0.0021 0.262 133.852 0.0131 0.362 187.762 0.0161 0.654 366.672 0.021/ 37.581
PIP-TSM 0.312 72.302 0.0021 0.423 226.763 0.0201 0.453 413.173 0.0171 0.735 573.053 0.035/ 86.143
PEER 0.342 96.353 0.0031 0.383 335.754 0.0181 0.463 560.284 0.0261 0.775 710.584 0.0522 93.314
integrating the consideration of price and quantity), this implies the
eectiveness of principled economic basis in business intelligence.
Another observation is that PEER also outperforms TSM, which
is interesting because the allocation results produced by TSM is
in fact also a Pareto ecient solution, while the dierence is that
TSM takes producer surplus into consideration for allocation of
benets. is observation veries the economic intuition that pro-
ducers and consumers have conicts of interest in the allocation
of total internet welfare (surplus), so that each party has to “steal”
surplus from the other side so as to benet themselves. As a result,
maximizing the benets of consumers alone (instead of together
with producers) helps consumers to gain beer experience.
We also see that the PIP-boosted algorithms are generally beer
than their corresponding non-PIP version, which is not surpris-
ing because we re-optimize their outputs to beer align with the
personalized utilities of users for Pareto eciency. But what is sur-
prising is that they did not signicantly outperform the randomly
initialized PEER approach.
More detailed examinations show that the recommendation lists
of NMF and BPRMF lead to heavily unbalanced service allocations
among dierent users aer processing by Algorithm 2, that those
active users tend to possess much higher surplus than inactive users.
is is because the inactive users are usually recommended with
the similar (mostly popular) items, so that they have to compete for
the limited benets from these items. As a result, the optimization
procedure of Algorithm 1 will nally converge into unbalanced
Pareto ecient solutions. But because TSM has already taken
user balance into consideration, its PIP-boosted version achieves
comparable performance with PEER.
6.4 Economic Eciency
We evaluate the economic eciency of the proposed algorithm
in this section. To do so, we calculate the accumulated consumer
surplus of a top-N recommendation list and average across the
users, which is dened as follows:
CS@N = 1
M
M∑
i=1
∑
j ∈Πi,N
(
ai j ln(1 +Qi j ) − PjQi j
)
(22)
where i and M are the index and the total number of testing users,
N is the length of recommendation list, and Πi,N is the recommen-
dation list for the i-th user. For fair comparison between algorithms,
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Figure 1: Comparison of dierent algorithms on (a) recom-
mendation performance and (b) economic eciency. e x-
axis is the length of recommendation list, and the y-axis is
(a) conversion rate and (b) average consumer surplus.
we take Qi j = 1 for the recommended items, which means that a
user will nally purchase one for each item in the recommendation
list. Figure 1(b) shows the results on averaged consumer surplus v.s.
the length of recommendation lists, and detailed results on selected
recommendation lengths are displayed in Table 2.
We see that the average consumer surplus is signicantly boosted
by the Pareto Improvement Process (PIP) on traditional recommen-
dation algorithms of NMF and BPRMF, which validates the eec-
tiveness of our PIP approach on promoting the economic eciency
of traditional algorithms. However, we also observe that PIP does
not achieve signicant improvement on TSM. e underlying rea-
son can be that TSM is also designed with a philosophy of surplus
maximization. Although it aempts to maximize the joint surplus
of both consumers and producers, it has indeed taken the benet
of users into consideration. Nevertheless, by maximizing the joint
consumer surplus in a direct manner, the PEER approach gains the
best performance on economic eciency in terms of accumulated
consumer surplus.
Besides, we see that the CS@N of NMF and BPRMF increases ap-
proximately linearly with the increase of recommendation length N ,
while in the surplus-driven approaches (e.g., PEER, TSM, PIP-TSM),
CS@N tends to increase with diminishing marginal increments.
is shows that the surplus-driven approaches are able to rank
those items of higher surplus for users to top positions in the list,
while traditional algorithms tend to distribute the items according
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to the probability of user likeness, with lile consideration of the
amount of benets that an item brings to a user.
6.5 Pareto Eciency
We also care about the Pareto eciency of the recommendation
(allocation) results, which measures the degree that a Web economic
system is close to its best possible ecient resource allocation status.
To do so, we calculate the averaged Percentage Utopia Surplus
(PUS) when a top-N recommendation list is provided to each user:
PUS@N = 1M
∑M
i=1
(
Si (QN )/S◦i
)
whereQN is the allocation matrix
corresponding to the top-N recommendation lists of M testing
users – that each recommended item is allocated with a quantity
of one to its corresponding user. We also calculate the PUS value
given the directly estimated allocation matrixQ for those applicable
algorithms (i.e., PEER, PIP-X, and TSM), and this result is shown as
PUSQ in Table 2.
We see that the PEER approach generally gains the best PUS@N
performance on most selections of recommendation length N , but
the results are not statistically signicant except N = 20 and against
NMF or BPRMF, because the consumer surplus is too small when
only a few (i.e., N ) items are provided. However, results become
clearer when we do not limit the number of provided items, and
evaluate PUS on the output allocation matrix Q directly, as shown
in the last column of Table 2. Note that the NMF and BPRMF
algorithms do not produce any allocation matrix directly, so the
PUSQ measure is not applicable to them.
It is seen that PIP-NMF/BPRMF did not achieve satisfactory
PUS even aer promoting by PIP. Detailed examinations indicate
that this is also due to the unbalanced initial allocations given by
NMF/BPRMF, so that some users possess very high initial surplus.
Per the nature of Pareto improvement that avoids hurting anyone,
those users dominate the allocations so that other users eventually
gain only small surplus values, leading to low average PUS results.
In contrast, by treating consumer surplus in a balanced manner,
TSM gives beer initial surpluses and the PUS can be further pro-
moted by the PIP framework. Finally, by optimizing the consumer
surpluses toward utopia points directly, the PEER approach gains
signicantly the best average PUS – which when combined with
the observed improvement from TSM to PIP-TSM – veries the
Pareto eciency of our proposed optimization algorithms.
7 RELATEDWORK
e eciency of economic systems has long been a vitally impor-
tant research consideration in economics [4], especially in welfare
economics [16]. Ever since the existence of human social production
in ancient ages, people have been considering the proper, accept-
able, and mutually benecial ways for allocation of resources [42].
e breakthroughs of human production capability brought about
by the rst and second Industrial Revolution has further driven
the human society to rethink about the ways to eciently allocate
goods, capital, energy, and various other types of resources [39].
Although philosophically debated among economists for cen-
turies [30], it was not until the 1900’s that economic eciency were
proposed to be clearly and objectively measured – which is called
the Pareto criterion named aer Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923) [32], stating that an ecient status should be a situation
in which it is impossible to make anyone beer-o without making
someone worse-o. Pareto eciency (or Pareto optimality) has
been one of the most basic concepts in mainstream economics, and
it is widely used to analyze and optimize the resource allocation in
economic and engineering systems [28].
However, although the Web has shaped into a tremendous on-
line economy by continuously integrating human activities from
oine to online, the research community has seldom considered
the Pareto eciency of the Web from an economic point of view.
Actually, many of the Web-based services can be formalized into
the classical producer-consumer economic paradigm [52], where
consumers/users consume normal goods, nancial products, jobs,
or news feeds from producers in E-commerce [20], online nancing
[9, 26], crowd-sourcing [15, 17], or news portals [24], etc. By im-
plicitly assigning certain items to targeted users in technical forms
of personalized recommendation [18, 37] or search [7, 43], the Web
actually serves a fundamental role in resource allocation on the
massive online economy.
Nevertheless, traditional Web-based approaches mostly make
allocations to match the preference of each individual user, without
treating the system as a whole to examine the mutual inuence
between user benets. For example, both the Collaborative Fil-
tering (CF)-based [11, 19, 41], Content-based [25, 33], or hybrid
[8] recommendation approaches adopt meticulously designed al-
gorithms to model user preferences, but the recommendation of
an item to one user does not pose eect to others. is lack of
economic system-wise view leads to the Pareto ineciency of rec-
ommendation/allocation results.
Recent research lines have begun to tackle the problem. [52]
proposed economic recommendation by automatically estimating
the utility and surplus for each user-item pair from large-scale Web
data, such as consumer purchasing logs and online transactions.
Based on this, [53] further extended the work to multiple product
(i.e., product set) utility estimation, so that we can calculate the
utility of a combination of products by considering their comple-
mentary and substitutive relationships.
It is worthwhile to note that, as a frequently used optimization
strategy, Multi-Objective Optimization and the Pareto optimization
principle have been applied to plenty of research in recommender
systems [1, 2, 27, 31, 35, 36, 40, 48], but the related research mostly
focus on jointly maximizing mutually unaligned recommendation
objectives, e.g., accuracy, novelty, and diversity, etc. In this work,
however, we focus on the economic interpretation of recommender
systems, aiming to quantify and maximize the consumer surplus
(welfare) with MOO from an economic point of view to model the
online economy, which is dierent from the motivation of previous
MOO-based research.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Existing approaches of recommender systems focus on providing
targeted recommendations to match the preference of each indi-
vidual user. Although many Web applications have turned into
intact online economic systems, lile consideration is put on the
essential problem of online economic eciency – that why and
how Web-based systems can achieve ecient service allocations.
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is paper aempts to answer these principled questions based
on established economic theories melt with solid data-driven algo-
rithmic approaches. To do so, we rst formalized the online resource
allocation problem that serves as the basic functionality of most
Web-based systems, and further proposed algorithms to measure
the user benets in terms of utility and surplus. Based on this, we
proposed Pareto ecient economic recommendation that aempts
to nd the Pareto optimal service allocation of the system with
consideration of mutual correlations among users. To benet the
many existing personalized recommendation algorithms, we fur-
ther proposed the Pareto improvement process to re-optimize their
recommendation results into Pareto ecient ones. Experimental re-
sults on real-world industry data veried the proposed approaches
in terms of recommendation performance, consumer surplus, and
Pareto eciency.
is is our rst step towards an economic ecient Web, and
there is much room for further improvements. In the future, we
will study dierent utility functions in measuring consumer surplus.
We can compute other Pareto ecient solutions beyond the bal-
anced one to get the Pareto frontier and investigate their dierences
and relations. More importantly, our basic philosophy to promote
Web eciency is not restricted to e-commerce, and it can well be
generalized to various other Web services, which is promising to
both interdisciplinary research and practical applications.
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